Since its founding in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been a cornerstone of regional integration, fostering trade, political cooperation, and economic growth. But the bloc now faces its most severe crisis yet: the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—three Sahel states ruled by military juntas—which announced their withdrawal in January 2025. This move threatens to fracture West Africa’s economic unity, weaken collective bargaining power, and embolden anti-Western alliances. The implications for ECOWAS are profound, ranging from disrupted trade to diminished influence in global markets.
Why the Sahel states left
The three countries, all governed by military regimes that seized power in coups between 2020 and 2023, have grown increasingly disillusioned with ECOWAS. The bloc had imposed sanctions on them for their undemocratic takeovers, restricting trade and freezing financial assets. Rather than bend to pressure, the juntas accused ECOWAS of being a puppet of Western powers, particularly France, and sought closer ties with Russia’s Wagner Group and other alternative allies.
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Their exit follows a broader trend of anti-Western sentiment in the Sahel, where frustration over persistent insecurity, economic stagnation, and perceived neo-colonialism has fuelled a shift toward Moscow and Beijing. By leaving ECOWAS, the trio signals a rejection of the regional order and an embrace of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a new mutual defence pact established in September 2023. The AES is more than just a security arrangement—it is an economic gambit, with the three nations imposing a 0.5 percent levy on imports from ECOWAS in an attempt to fund their fledgling union.
Economic fallout for ECOWAS
1. Trade disruptions and lost markets
ECOWAS was designed to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, and people across West Africa. The departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—which together account for about 15 percent of ECOWAS’s GDP—will disrupt cross-border commerce.
· Intra-regional trade decline: These landlocked nations rely on coastal neighbours like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Ghana for imports and exports. According to Nigeria’s Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Niger Republic alone imported ₦25.9 billion worth of Nigerian goods in Q4 2024, while Burkina Faso took in ₦5.8 billion. If trade barriers rise, smuggling will likely increase—already, illegal border trade between Nigeria and Niger accounts for 2 percent-3.5 percent of Nigeria’s GDP, conducted through porous 1,500 km borders where goods move via camels, donkeys, and even empty fuel tankers.
· Energy and food security risks: Niger supplies uranium and agricultural products, while Mali and Burkina Faso contribute to regional food production. Any breakdown in supply chains could inflame existing shortages.
“The Sahel’s withdrawal is more than a political rift—it’s an economic earthquake.”
2. Weakened currency union prospects
ECOWAS has long aimed to introduce a single currency, the Eco, to rival the CFA franc—a currency still used by the AES states and pegged to the euro via the French treasury. The exit of three members—especially Niger, an economic linchpin—could delay or derail this plan. Investor confidence in the region may wane, complicating monetary policy coordination.
3. Security costs and migration pressures
The Sahel is the epicentre of West Africa’s jihadist insurgency. ECOWAS had backed the G5 Sahel force, now defunct after Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew. Without coordination, security gaps could widen, leading to:
· Increased military spending: Neighbouring states may need to bolster border security, diverting funds from development.
· Refugee flows: Escalating violence could push more migrants toward coastal states, straining resources.
4. Geopolitical shifts: Russia and China fill the void
The Sahel juntas have already deepened ties with Moscow, which provides mercenaries and arms in exchange for mining rights to gold, uranium, and other resources. China, too, is expanding its footprint through infrastructure loans. If ECOWAS fails to reintegrate these states, it risks losing influence to rival powers, making it harder to negotiate favourable trade terms with the EU or the U.S.
The AES’s risky economic gamble
The newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is attempting to assert economic independence by:
· Introducing a common passport to replace ECOWAS travel documents.
· Imposing a 0.5 percent tax on non-AES imports, a move aimed at funding their union but one that could backfire given their chronic trade deficits.
· Promoting local production, though they currently lack the industrial base to replace imports.
However, the AES faces severe structural weaknesses:
· Low Human Development Index (HDI) scores (all below 0.5).
· Dependence on foreign goods with no immediate substitutes.
· Economic instability due to sanctions and reduced ECOWAS trade.
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Can ECOWAS survive this blow?
The bloc is not doomed—Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Senegal remain economic heavyweights—but its credibility is at stake. To mitigate damage, ECOWAS could:
· Offer concessions: Easing sanctions in exchange for a return to democratic governance might lure the juntas back.
· Strengthen ties with remaining members: Accelerating the eco-currency or improving infrastructure links could reinforce unity.
· Engage alternative partners: Expanding trade with Morocco or Mauritania could offset lost markets.
Yet if more countries follow the Sahel’s lead—Guinea and Chad are watching closely—ECOWAS could unravel entirely. The coming months will test whether West Africa’s economic community can adapt or if it will succumb to fragmentation.
Conclusion: A region at a crossroads
The Sahel’s withdrawal is more than a political rift—it’s an economic earthquake. ECOWAS must now navigate a fractured landscape where trade, security, and monetary policies are in flux. If it fails to reassert its relevance, the bloc may find itself sidelined in a region increasingly shaped by Russian mercenaries, Chinese loans, and military rule. For West Africa, the cost of disunity could be decades of stunted growth and instability.
The question now is whether ECOWAS can reform quickly enough to prevent further defections—or if the Sahel’s exodus marks the beginning of the end for West Africa’s most ambitious economic union.
Dr Oluyemi Adeosun is BusinessDay’s Chief Economist.
