The 2011 election victory of President Goodluck Jonathan – a southerner – triggered violence across the north that resulted in more than 800 deaths. The February 2015 elections are likely to see a repeat of this violence, but its extent and severity will be determined by the conduct and outcome of the polls.
• Jonathan remains likely to win the presidential poll, raising the threat of post-election violence in the north. Islamist militant group Boko Haram is likely to seek to exploit the unrest to further its campaign.
• A shock defeat for Jonathan would trigger unrest in the Niger Delta, albeit on a smaller scale. A re-emergence of regional militancy in the longer term poses a greater risk under this scenario, elevating onshore security threats to oil and gas operators.
• Nonetheless, broad stability is ultimately likely to prevail following a short period of heightened violence and uncertainty. However, the government’s legitimacy will be more challenged and its institutions more divided than at any time since democracy was restored in 1999.
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• Business exposure to post-election violence varies considerably across the country, but is likely to be greater in northern and central regions, and in parts of the Niger Delta. All companies will need to consider business continuity plans, and crisis and evacuation management planning.
Great expectations
In a repeat of 2011, the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) is increasingly likely to select former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari (1983-85) as its presidential candidate. Buhari has contested the last three elections unsuccessfully on various political platforms, coming second in 2011 on the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) ticket with 32 percent of the vote. A moderate but conservative Muslim renowned for his tough stance on corruption, Buhari is hugely popular in parts of the north. Many in the region feel aggrieved by the lack of local development and opportunity, and will once again pin their hopes on Buhari.
In 2011, Buhari’s supporters were fired up by the opposition’s message that a free and fair vote would guarantee them victory, despite polls suggesting otherwise. Similarly, heightened expectations this time around mean that a Buhari defeat would be likely to trigger post-election violence in the north as frustrated youths target communities perceived to have backed Jonathan.
Meanwhile, having stepped up its activities in the run-up to the polls, Boko Haram would be likely to exploit post-election unrest to make further advances in the north-east. The group may also stage high-profile attacks in other parts of the country, including the capital Abuja and – albeit less likely – the commercial capital Lagos. However, even if Boko Haram successfully exploits post-election instability, a military coup would be unlikely in the short term in light of the divided military leadership.
The Niger Delta question
With the opposition more united and better organised than in previous polls, it may yet secure a surprise victory. Reversing our most likely scenario, a defeat for Jonathan would be likely to fuel protests and violence in the Niger Delta. However, civil unrest would be likely to be more limited and less severe. This is partly because vote-rigging allegations in the event of an APC victory would not be as credible given the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP)’s control over the system, and partly because the region’s ethnic and communal divisions would make broad-based public mobilisation less likely.
The greater risk under this scenario is that Niger Delta militancy will re-emerge in light of waning regional support for the government amnesty programme without Jonathan’s leadership. Although the senior former militant leadership, many of whom have significant business interests, would be unlikely to return to the creeks, a younger generation of militants would seek to take their place. An erosion of militant capabilities during the amnesty means that violence in the immediate aftermath of the polls would be largely uncoordinated, though sabotage would affect production. However, militancy would gradually become more organised in the ensuing months, significantly increasing onshore security threats to oil and gas operators.
Broad stability to prevail
The conduct and outcome of the 2015 elections will determine the extent and nature of the post-election crisis. However, we believe that broad stability is ultimately likely to prevail in light of Nigeria’s demonstrated ability to ride out crises as civilian institutions have strengthened, the army has become less politicised and the economy has grown considerably more vibrant since the 1999 restoration of civilian rule.
Elite accommodation and local power-broking are likely to play a key role in assuaging tensions, with northern powerbrokers likely to attempt to mitigate the negative local economic impact of violence. Eyes will also turn to the army, which in 2011 effectively imposed a curfew across parts of the north to largely quell unrest within 48 hours. The army’s institutional pride has been battered by its failures in tackling the Boko Haram crisis. However, the senior hierarchy is likely to remain loyal to the government in the event of a crisis. Meanwhile, mid-ranking officers stand to gain little from a coup, which would be unlikely to draw united institutional support.
Managing the risks
Business exposure to post-election violence varies considerably across the country. Businesses with assets and supply chains across the north have the highest risk exposure in light of the likelihood of post-election violence. However, all companies will need to consider their exposure and mitigation measures, notably regarding business continuity plans, and crisis and evacuation management planning. Many companies choose to corral staff – where possible – in relative safe havens around election time, notably Lagos, which typically witnesses lower levels of election-related violence and is better internationally connected.
(c): Control Risks Services (West Africa) Ltd