The global order is no longer unipolar. The dominance once exercised by the United States and its Western allies has gradually declined, giving way to a multipolar world shaped by the competing influences of China, Russia, India, the Gulf states, and other emerging powers. This realignment is fundamentally reshaping Africa’s political, economic, and security architectures, creating both unprecedented challenges and opportunities. For the first time in decades, Africa is not a passive recipient of global currents but a strategic arena where new power rivalries are playing out. The question now is if the continent can turn this moment into a path toward self-driven growth, or once again allow external powers dictate its future.
The weakening grip of the West is most visible in Francophone Africa. France’s post-colonial dominance, long sustained through military bases, political patronage, and resource extraction, began to unravel after 2020. Political upheavals, security failures, and shifting alliances led to French military expulsions from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), Niger (2023), and Chad (2025). Despite deploying 5,000 troops under Operation Barkhane in 2014, terrorism deaths in the Sahel increased tenfold between 2019 and 2024, exposing the failure of neocolonial security architecture. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger reflects a decisive rejection of external tutelage and a new assertion of African agency.
The retreat of US influence has been less dramatic when compared to France, but no less significant. Washington’s dismantling of development programmes and aid freezes caused initial shock, yet the overall impact turned out to be modest. At just $6.5 billion in 2023, US aid accounted for less than 0.4% of Africa’s $3.4 trillion GDP. What seemed at first like a crisis has in fact accelerated Africa’s reorientation — from dependence on foreign aid to a search for diversified partnerships and self-reliance. While disruptions to health and humanitarian programmes bring short-term pain, the long-term effect may be a stronger, more resilient continent.
On the other hand, multipolarity is becoming increasingly visible as new actors deepen their presence. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner, valued at $282 billion, four times US-Africa trade. After a wave of controversial loans by 2016, Beijing has recalibrated, focusing on selective, sustainable partnerships. Projects such as the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway and Rwanda’s mRNA vaccine plant show a pivot toward value-added production and industrial integration. Russia, through Wagner and now the Africa Corps, has gained influence in security and resource sectors, displacing France in several countries. Yet beyond power projection, Moscow has delivered little in governance or economic transformation.
What emerges is not the replacement of Western dominance by China or Russia, but a genuinely competitive multipolar environment. For Africa, this is both a challenge and an opportunity. Multipolarity could fragment the continent into rival spheres of influence, or it could be leveraged to secure better terms from all external actors. The continent must strategically take advantage of competition between China, Russia, India, Gulf states, and Western powers to secure favourable terms through diversified partnerships.
Opportunities in Africa are limitless. The Brookings Institution’s Foresight Africa 2025–2030 Report estimates Africa’s GDP growth at 4.2% in 2025, making it the second-fastest growing region globally after Asia. Evidence shows Africa can achieve “The Africa That Is Possible” through coordinated action across three critical dimensions.
First, economic sovereignty must be pursued through deeper integration. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must accelerate beyond tariff reductions into genuine market integration. This means establishing continental standards regimes, coordinated industrial policies, and integrated infrastructure. For example, a $100 billion investment in universal internet connectivity would provide the backbone of a globally competitive knowledge economy serving African priorities.
Second, Africa must embrace strategic coordination over fragmentation. The new multipolar environment risks regional blocs aligning with competing powers, deepening divisions. To avoid this, short-term national interests must be subordinated to long-term continental unity. Institutions such as the AU, its eight Regional Economic Communities, and specialised agencies must evolve from diplomatic forums into effective coordination bodies with binding authority over critical areas like minerals, digital governance, and security.
Third, knowledge production must become a strategic priority. Africa cannot build sovereignty without intellectual independence. This requires systematic investment in pan-African research networks, the integration of indigenous knowledge systems, and globally competitive universities that remain rooted in African contexts. Only then will Africa’s priorities, rather than external donor cycles, drive the continent’s development agenda.
The collapse of Françafrique and the rise of alternative partnerships represent a historic shift toward genuine African sovereignty. For the first time since independence, African states have space to negotiate rather than obey. But multipolarity is no guarantee. It offers the stage, but Africa must be a strategic actor in its own course.
In another 25 years, Africa will account for more than a quarter of humanity. The stakes could not be higher. The continent stands at a crossroads: seize this moment to build an integrated, knowledge-driven, and sovereign future, or remain a fragmented terrain of external rivalry. The multipolar world has created an opening. “The Africa that is possible” is within reach. Now is the moment to make a choice.
