There has been considerable backlash and debate over whether four years is enough to fix Nigeria. To some, it appears to be an insurmountable mountain; to others, it is simply a matter of leadership. A president with good intentions, knowing they have only four years, may feel they have nothing to lose, and therefore may not be afraid to step on toes to achieve what truly matters.
While it is perfectly natural for citizens to hold divergent opinions on this issue, they must also understand the difference between engaging in mere activities and working on things that truly matter. In “Why Nations Fail,” written by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, the authors argue that what truly matters in creating shared prosperity for citizens is inclusive political and economic institutions. In essence, fixing Nigeria must begin with political reform, encompassing both the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the judiciary.
According to them, “it is the political process that determines what economic institutions people live under, and it is the political institutions that determine how this process works.” For example, it is the political institutions of a nation that determine the ability of citizens to control politicians and influence how they behave. This, in turn, determines whether politicians act as agents of the citizens, albeit imperfectly, or whether they abuse the power entrusted to them (or that they have usurped) to amass personal fortunes and pursue agendas detrimental to the public good.
Political institutions first, policies will follow
Sub-Saharan African countries are poor today because of their inability to build inclusive political institutions that work for the people. Instead, they have continued to engage in what Acemoglu and Robinson termed “prosperity engineering”. These engineering attempts come in two flavours. The first is often promoted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other policy think tanks based in Washington, London, and Paris. These institutions argue that poor development stems from bad economic policies and institutions and, in response, prescribe a checklist of reforms, famously encapsulated in the Washington Consensus. These reforms emphasise macroeconomic stability, a smaller government, liberalised markets, and privatisation, alongside efforts to curb corruption and improve public service delivery.
While many of these reforms may appear reasonable on their own, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that they overlook a critical factor: the underlying political institutions that shape policy choices and implementation. In contexts where political elites remain unaccountable and vested interests dominate, such reforms either go unadopted, are implemented only in form, or are swiftly undermined.
Given this context, it becomes clear that even if a governor or president remains in office for decades, as long as political institutions remain extractive and exclusive, painful economic reforms will continue to recycle without meaningful progress. Longevity in office does not translate into prosperity.
Staying long in the office doesn’t guarantee progress
Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe for over 30 years; once celebrated as a liberation hero, he presided over a spectacular economic collapse, with inflation reaching an unimaginable 230 million percent in 2008. In Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens led the All People’s Congress (APC) for 18 years after independence, only to deepen poverty and entrench authoritarianism. Similarly, Hosni Mubarak held power in Egypt for three decades, yet widespread suffering and economic stagnation persisted until his eventual ouster in 2011. These examples reinforce Acemoglu and Robinson’s central argument: without inclusive political institutions that prioritise broad-based development, reform efforts are either hollow, manipulated, or doomed to fail.
Under the presidency of William McKinley, the 25th President of the United States, economic inequality deepened, largely due to the aggressive business practices of powerful industrialists such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan. These men, later dubbed “Robber Barons”, amassed immense wealth by stifling competition, establishing monopolies, and exploiting both labour and consumers. Their dominance left ordinary Americans at the mercy of unchecked corporate power. In 1901, shortly after winning re-election, McKinley was assassinated by an angry citizen, leading to the swearing-in of his Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt, as the 26th President.
Roosevelt, in contrast to his predecessor, took a bold stand against corporate excess. In his first term, he challenged J.P. Morgan’s railroad monopoly in the Northern Securities case, signalling a new era of antitrust enforcement. He also intervened in the 1902 Coal Strike, asserting the government’s role in labour disputes, and launched investigations into corporate misconduct, efforts that laid the groundwork for the creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These actions culminated in the historic breakup of Standard Oil, controlled by Rockefeller, marking a turning point in the fight against monopoly capitalism in America. Even though his predecessor had been in power for five years, he never undertook such measures, yet it took Roosevelt just one term to deliver.
The Judiciary’s role in INEC’s lack of accountability
Given the current state of the nation and the recommendations of Acemoglu and Robinson, a one-term president in Nigeria should prioritise fixing the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Nigerian politics can only become inclusive and participatory through a truly independent electoral body. As of today, “Nigeria has no legal standard for a free, fair or credible election,” according to a 2008 Supreme Court ruling.
The judiciary, too, is not spared from political encroachment. Judges are appointed by political office holders and, as a result, remain susceptible to the pressures and influence of those same politicians. Just as INEC is not truly independent, so too is Nigeria’s judiciary compromised.
As Chidi Odinkalu, Professor of Law at the Fletcher School, rightly observed in a recent critique of Nigeria’s judiciary, “These 2008 decisions have combined to denude elections in Nigeria of meaning as expressions of the will of the people.” His analysis reinforces how, over the years, judicial rulings have stripped the electoral process of legitimacy, enabling INEC to operate with impunity and shielding politicians from accountability.
When citizens can no longer expect fairness from the electoral commission or protection from the courts, democratic participation is rendered meaningless. A president truly committed to reform must begin by restoring confidence in elections, not just through rhetoric, but through bold institutional restructuring that ensures INEC’s independence, transparency, and effectiveness. That alone could lay the groundwork for broader economic and social reforms, making a single term truly transformational.
Why political reform must come first — A Minister’s revelation
Reforming the political structure is so vital that even a former public servant has testified to this. Shamsuddeen Usman, former Minister of Budget and Economic Planning and author of Public Policy and Agent Interests: Perspectives from the Emerging World, once admitted that he had underestimated the impact of politics. “When I was in the private sector, I used to say that if only we could get the economy right, everything would be alright. Now, with my experience in the public service, I say if we do not get the politics right, nothing will be alright,” he said during the unveiling of his book.
The only true public good a one-term presidency can offer Nigeria is political reform, and that reform must begin with INEC and the judiciary.
