Final report of the Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB) on air crashes that occurred within seven years points to human error by the crew and laxity on the part of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA).
Speaking at a conference yesterday, Akin Olatero, commissioner, AIB, disclosed that report on Dana crash showed that the MD 83 aircraft first engine lost power 17 minutes into the flight.
Olatero said on final approach to landing in Lagos, the second engine lost power and failed to respond to throttle movement on demand for increased power to sustain the aircraft in its flight configuration.
According to the report, the inappropriate omission of the use of the Checklist, and the crew’s inability to appreciate the severity of the power-related problem, their subsequent failure to land at the nearest suitable airfield, lack of situation awareness, inappropriate decision making, and poor airmanship were identified as major causes of the accident.
Four safety recommendations were made to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), targeting Pratt and Whitney, the engine manufacturer, Dana Airline and to Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) on Quality Assurance management.
It would be recalled at that on June 3rd 2012, Dana Air had a major accident that claimed the lives 153 persons onboard the airplane, including six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire.
The flight originated from Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). AIB published a preliminary report on 5th September, 2012 and four interim statements have been published. Four Interim Safety Recommendations were made and have been implemented by the Operator and the Regulatory Authority.
On AOS helicopter, the Accident Investigation Bureau identified causes to be non-adherence of the Pilot to Visual Flight Rules of clear-of cloud and obstacles while maintaining ground contact at all times led to Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
In addition to this, the report showed that the Pilot was not Instrument Rated and lacked route familiarisation.
Five safety recommendations have been made, three of which were targeted at NCAA; one to NAMA; and one to Nigerian Police Force.
On the Presidential Committee Implementation On Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS), the report showed that the decision of the crew to continue the glide approach despite repeated landing gear warnings with the power lever below 25 per cent rather than initiating a Go-around was the cause of the accident.
Contributory factors include the failure of the crew to recognize the landing gear warnings, no Standard Operating Procedure/Training Policy in place, the crew low hours and experience, coupled with the rostering of two pilots with same capability on a training flight, Lack of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training.
Two safety recommendations were made to NCAA and to the Nigerian Police Force.
On Bristow Helicopters, the causes were identified as 115v cable loom chafed and arced with hydraulic pipeline, puncturing it and causing a high pressure leak which ignited on contact with hot surface of the Right Hand heat exchanger, resulting in fire on the Upper Deck.
Contributory factors include effectivity of the aircraft excluded in the Alert Service Bulletin ASB No. 92-20-002A issued by the manufacturer and the Technical Directive TD-S92A-29-99 did not include Check/Inspection of the right hand side of the Upper Deck.
Two safety recommendations made in the published report and both targeted to Bristow Helicopters.
