Having held back from writing of the EU-Africa Summit which attracted over sixty heads of state and government from both continents to Brussels in early April, because of the opaque subject matter, I find myself compelled to make a comment. On reflection, it strikes me as a geo-political moment for both continents as this 21st century progresses, and what was one seen as “unequal partnership”, or “collective clientelism” (in the memorable words of the academic John Ravenhill, is acquiring a different complexion.
But first, more on the word “opaque”. The BBC dictionary definition is “difficult to understand” though I prefer the object or substance that “has enough thickness or colour to prevent you seeing through it”. It reminds of a Japanese research student who was seeking information when I worked in the European Commission in the 1970s, who said he felt the building (in those days the Y-shaped building in Brussels’ European quarter called the Berlaymont) was surrounded by a “deep mist”.
In the nine-and-a-half years I worked there, although younger and more spirited, I was compelled to deal with the complex form of expression that some called Euro-speak, itself a “deep mist”. This grew from the complex linguistic pudding arising when French is translated into English. Once simply called franglais, it has over years accumulated phrases and syntax from other languages. This notion is developed in an article in The Financial Times last month by Michael Skapinker in which he detects, as English is used more and more intensively in Europe with “lexical quirks” and “common grammatical tics that transcended mother tongues,” a new English dialect that he baptises as “Eurish”.
While understanding his meaning, my own problem is more basic. French is an elegant language of emotion, hard to translate into the subtle, bony sub-structures of English – a much more mongrel tongue. Too often the translation/transition gives birth to the incomprehensible. Worse, I was dealing with two jargon-prone disciplines, development and economics, exploring subjects such as trade protocols or project management. I still wonder how I managed to explain comprehensibly the Lomé Convention’s highways and byways to visiting groups.
It’s also a miracle to me that I sat attentively through months of negotiations navigating the mysteries of non-reciprocity, or stabilisation of commodity export earnings, non-tariff barriers, phyto-sanitary regulations… writing of it even now, I still face the challenge of making it interesting with drooping eyelids. The documents of the JAES (the Joint Africa Europe Strategy approved in 2007), which underpin the EU-Africa Summits, some of which appear to be written in ‘Eurish,’ produce the same effect, their length being in inverse proportion to their implementation.
The summit itself seemed an unexceptional affair, with one or two annoyances such as the refusal by Robert Mugabe to attend because no visa was granted to his wife. This pickiness caused South African President Zuma’s absence, although he was in full election campaign. The vexed issue of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) was kept off the agenda, although was, I am told, discussed. Officially they are not ‘EU-Africa,’ but connect the EU and the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group through the four Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Accords. Moreover, they include only sub-Saharan Africa – North Africa prefers separate accords.
These parallel policies give Europe-Africa relations a certain dysfunctionality, but the expiry of Cotonou in 2020 may help rationalise the situation. The ACP (now including both non-Lomé countries Cuba and South Africa) do not, however, for the most part wish to see their alliance broken up, even if it would suit some in Europe. They resent the divisiveness of the EPAs, even as the EU earnestly protests support for regional integration. And while they feel the East European caucus in Brussels is working to increase their own development aid at the expense of others, the ACP now see the possibility of recovering the negotiating muscle they had in the early seventies: although they may not be able to retrieve the prized non- reciprocity they will continue to be reluctant to concede privileged market access.
In Africa especially they are aware that the continent has moved up the EU’s agenda in security matters and are aware of substantial support received for AU military operations in Sudan, Somalia, Mali. The security interests are of course mutual, and African countries are still wary conceding too much in this direction. Equally significant is the changed balance of global power, and though the summit dangled substantial funds before African leaders (20bn Euros a year between 2014 and 2020). They are aware that the EU is still their biggest trading partner, but it may not be for much longer. In a multi-polar world, others are now aware of Africa’s growing economic attraction. Quite apart from the well-advertised Chinese interest, there are other Asian powers, as well as in the Middle East and the Americans (such as the USA and Brazil), all making a play. No longer marginalised, Africa can if it chooses begin to shape her own relationships.
Kaye Whiteman
