When Nigeria’s military rulers gathered in the mid 1970s to design a new governance structure, they articulated compelling reasons for abandoning the Westminster parliamentary system. General Murtala Mohammed’s administration argued that the conflict between ceremonial and executive authority could trigger ethnic strife, pointing to the constitutional crisis of 1964-1965 that had paralysed the First Republic, planting seeds that eventually led to the civil war.
They envisioned a presidential system that would eliminate “ruthless political competition,” discourage institutionalised opposition, and prevent power concentration in few hands.
Ironically, the system they created has delivered precisely the opposite outcomes they sought to avoid.
It was General Aguiyi Ironsi’s 1966 Unification Decree No. 34 that first replaced regional governments with a unitary system. Nigeria is officially a federal state, yet many of its institutions, practices, and mindsets remain fundamentally unitary in nature. Misplaced notions about federalism have caused people to perceive or implement federalism through the lens of a unitary state structure — often leading to deep systemic confusion, centralised control, and policy inefficiencies.
The fundamental error was not in choosing presidentialism, but in wholesale importation without cultural adaptation. Unlike successful federations, Nigeria created what scholars aptly describe as federalism “in name but unitary in practice.” The 1999 Constitution concentrates 68 exclusive items under federal control — from education to policing — reducing states to a little more than mere administrative units thar are dependent on monthly federal allocations.
The recent university admissions crisis perfectly illustrates this dysfunction. The crisis exposed the fundamental flaws in the “unitary-federal” system that has strangled innovation, stifled local initiative, and perpetuated inefficiency for over two decades. Federal institutions operate as centralised behemoths, driven more by a lifeless uniformity than celebrate the uniqueness that each participating member of the federation brings to the national table. In other nations, federating units would be able to innovate processes to reflect local labour markets. Here, everyone is trapped in a one-size-fits-all federal bureaucracy.
This overcentralisation has created a cascade of failures. States derive over 90 percent of revenues from federal oil allocations, destroying incentives for local resource generation. The result is a “rentier mentality” where states wait for monthly allocations rather than developing productive capacities. Meanwhile, federal agencies become patronage machines, prioritising elite interests over merit and efficiency.
The costs of this dysfunctional system are staggering. From an economic point of view, Nigeria operates one of the world’s most expensive governance structures while delivering minimal public services. The bloated federal bureaucracy consumes resources that could fund development, while states remain too weak to address local challenges effectively.
Politically, the winner-takes-all presidential system has exacerbated ethnic tensions rather than mitigating them. Elections become zero-sum competitions between regional blocs, with the university quota system serving as another flashpoint for North-South grievances. Rather than promoting national unity, the system institutionalises division.
Most tragically, the human cost is measured in lost potential. Bright students trapped in admissions bureaucracy represent millions of Nigerians whose talents are wasted by systemic inefficiency. Poor infrastructure, inadequate healthcare, and persistent insecurity reflect a governance system that cannot translate Nigeria’s enormous human and natural resources into prosperity.
The contrast with Ghana and Benin Republic is instructive. Both countries have avoided the “imperial presidency” that characterises Nigerian governance, where power concentrates in the person and office of the president with minimal checks and balances. Most importantly, both countries have invested in local governance capacities. Ghana and Benin have empowered subnational units to address local challenges, creating more responsive and accountable governance. In Nigeria, states remain fiscally dependent and administratively weak.
Nigeria’s governance crisis requires fundamental restructuring, not cosmetic reforms. The nation is in dire need of broader constitutional reforms that devolve real powers to states. Education, for one, should be moved to the concurrent list, allowing states to establish admission criteria reflecting regional needs while maintaining national standards.
Fiscal federalism must replace the current allocation system. States should control greater shares of locally generated revenues while contributing to federal functions. This would incentivise productivity and innovation while reducing dependency on oil revenues.
Security decentralisation through state and community policing would address the local insurgencies that federal forces cannot contain. The current centralised security architecture has failed spectacularly, from Boko Haram in the Northeast to banditry in the Northwest. Most critically, Nigeria must strengthen institutions for accountability and transparency.
The JAMB crisis is more than an administrative failure — it symbolises a governance system that has betrayed the hopes of those who designed it and the expectations of citizens who live under it. The military had sought to create a system that would promote unity, accountability, and development. Instead, they bequeathed a structure that perpetuates division, corruption, and underdevelopment.
The examples of Ghana and Benin prove that presidential federalism can work in African contexts. Nigeria’s failure lies not in the system chosen, but in the failure to adapt it to local realities and build the institutional foundations necessary for its success. Until Nigeria confronts these fundamental structural problems, crises like the university admissions breakdown will continue to expose the poverty of its governance architecture.
The promise of federalism can still be fulfilled, but only through the courage to acknowledge past mistakes and the wisdom to learn from those who have succeeded where Nigeria has failed.
