Everyone agrees that Nigeria is facing “enormous challenges” and that the economy is “in deep problem” as President Buhari himself has put it. There is, indeed, a consensus that the existing order has failed and needs to be replaced. This should induce far-reaching institutional and policy reforms in the country. President Buhari needs to understand the crisis hypothesis and take advantage of the national mood. A comprehensive reform should emerge from the ashes of the national crisis.
A corollary to the crisis hypothesis is the mandate hypothesis. The argument is that when a new government has won a mandate for change in an election, the scope for reform should be greater. Thus, a reform is relatively easier with a clear mandate than without it. President Buhari and the APC presented an agenda for transformational change to Nigerians during the election, and Nigeria endorsed it by voting them into power. The president now has a clear mandate to deliver on his party’s manifesto. Taken together, both the crisis and mandate hypotheses favour President Buhari and give him real authority to introduce and implement major reforms.
But Buhari should also be aware of the honeymoon hypothesis. Every new government enjoys a honeymoon during which the public will give it the benefit of the doubt and blame any sacrifices and difficulties on its predecessor. The logic of this hypothesis is that it is easier to introduce major reforms during a honeymoon than after the honeymoon has ended. As Buhari himself has noted, he is still “basking in a reservoir of goodwill”, both locally and internationally. But goodwill and honeymoon can easily be dissipated. Indeed, unless the Buhari government fleshes out its reform agenda within the traditional 100 days of being in power, it would be begin to lose public support. President Buhari needs to identify some “low hanging fruits” and secure some quick wins early while setting out the full details of his reform agenda. If he fails to take advantage of the honeymoon and the goodwill to win hearts and minds and embed his reforms, the next hypothesis may work against him rather than in his favour.
Lastly, there is the weak opposition hypothesis. The simple argument here is that major reforms are easier to introduce when political and institutional opposition is weak. For instance, fundamental reforms are possible when the opposition parties are discredited and disorganised and when civil society organisations, including the media, are supportive or at least not hostile. However, the reality in the Nigerian situation is that opposition to Buhari’s government is likely to be ferocious, with time! The media, particularly the social media, which contributed to his election, would, ironically, be one of his strongest critics. Secondly, the main opposition party, PDP, will behave like a wounded lion. The party is presently discredited and even disorganised, but it has the capacity to cause huge difficulties for Buhari and the APC as PDP members in the National Assembly have shown when they colluded with aggrieved APC lawmakers to reject the party’s choices for the presiding officers in the Senate and the House of Representatives. But the opposition is entitled to exploit the weaknesses of the government and the ruling party.
Yet the greatest opposition to the Buhari government may come from his party.
The APC is a big tent, with different factions, vested interests and power bases. As I have written previously on this page, APC is a grand coalition of strange bedfellows, with no common ideological thread. Expect high profile, high octane rows in the party over policy direction and other issues. With the level of indiscipline that APC members have demonstrated in less than three weeks in office, particularly with the National Assembly saga, it’s not certain that Buhari can carry his party along or corral them to support his reform efforts. So, the weak opposition hypothesis does not seem to favour Buhari.
That said, however, some of the factors that would shape the success or otherwise of Buhari’s reform agenda are things that can be controlled by him. For instance, he can significantly minimise political and institutional opposition if he delivers on his party’s promises. To maximise success, he needs to take four steps. These are based on the experiences of countries that have achieved successful reforms, and documented in the work of the Chilean economist Jose Pinera.
First, Buhari should assemble a competent and coherent team of ministers who know what to do to further the general good and who can help design and deliver his reform objectives. The existence of such a competent team with a common and coherent view of what needed to be done is a key factor in any successful reform.
Second, he should have a bold and comprehensive programme of radical reform and a rapid timetable for implementation. Of course, this doesn’t mean that all his reform objectives could be achieved at once, but he needs to set out his stall and produce a comprehensive plan of what he wants to achieve and how they are linked strategically to each other. He should also create a mechanism for tracking the implementation of his government’s policies. He should embrace the idea of “deliverology” propounded by Michael Barber, a senior adviser to former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.
Third, in order to achieve the first and second requirements, he must have a vision of history. This means that he must have a long time horizon. It’s only when he acts as a visionary with an eye on his legacy that he would have the boldness and determination to introduce far-reaching reforms, and provide leadership and direction to his team of experts.
And fourth, it has been shown that leaders who introduce successful reforms are those who have the will and ability to appeal directly to the general public and bypass vested interests. Unfortunately, vested interests have always captured the governments of Nigeria. But President Buhari should reach out to the Nigerian people over the heads of special interests. Certainly, he should take a consensus approach and bring his fellow politicians with him when making decisions. But Buhari must never forget to mobilise public support for his policy reforms. Only with overwhelming public support can the president overcome the resistance of entrenched interests.
So, Buhari should understand the politics of policy reform. While the crisis and the mandate hypotheses favour him, the honeymoon and weak opposition hypotheses may not. The challenge for him is how to keep most Nigerians happy beyond the honeymoon period. The solution lies in his performance. He needs to get to grips very early and deliver some quick wins. Then, he needs a bold and comprehensive programme of reform. And he needs a very competent and coherent team that can help him deliver on his vision. If the general public and the media see him as a radical and reforming president, and can see some fruits of his reforms, they will support him and help him neutralise opposition from vested interests. He must never allow the public and the media to characterise him as lethargic or accuse him government of inertia; that would be fatal. President Buhari must master the politics of reform and deliver the change that Nigeria needs!
Olu Fasan
