We continue the countdown to March 28, 2015, the revised date for the conduct of Nigeria’s much-awaited presidential elections. By INEC’s own admission, at least ten million additional voters have now secured their permanent voters cards (PVCs) as a result of the poll postponement, validating the decision to move the election forward. In most states, the percentage PVC collection rates have improved significantly and INEC itself has been a major beneficiary of the shift in dates in terms of its preparations. I turn today to the policy implications of the main central scenarios – “continuity”, i.e., of the Jonathan presidency, and “change” to a General Muhammadu Buhari regime.
I have reviewed the two scenarios against some defined indices – internal governing coherence, security, economic policy orientation, energy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, infrastructure, foreign policy and financial sector policy and regulation. I have mentioned on this page that the current government’s policy performance has been significantly better than it gets credit for. I blame that on the government itself – weak information and communication management; poor strategic awareness and positioning; allowing its opponents to brand it negatively and ignoring signs of significant brand damage until it was almost too late; and allowing adverse forces to seize almost complete control of the media (conventional and social) space while it preoccupied itself with power and the largesse of office. Such poor awareness and low attention span manifested in substantive policy, politics and administration as well – allowing opponents almost push it out of the South West by seeming to acquiesce in the region’s loss of the speakership of the House of Representatives without recognizing that the region was going to be decisive in the next elections; allowing internal and external adversaries dissuade it from decisive action against “Boko Haram” when it should have been clear that insecurity would hurt it in the polls; and allowing political, regional and civil opposition to thwart its agenda of in the oil and gas sector (Petroleum Industry Bill and downstream deregulation).
In the event, the Jonathan regime has made itself vulnerable in these elections on three fronts – corruption or perceptions of it, insecurity, and oil sector management. In other areas, Jonathan’s record is actually strong, in some cases stellar! As Jonathan correctly boasted at his meeting last Sunday with 5,000 youths in Lagos, no Nigerian government can flaunt a record anywhere approaching his regime in the areas of agriculture sector reform; investments in the university sector; reform of the Almajiri educational system in the North; investments in the transportation sector – road, rail and aviation; establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority); empowerment of women; YOUWIN and other youth entrepreneurial initiatives; industrial policy – automobile, cement, local content in oil and gas, and now power, agribusiness, etc.; structural attempts to deal with corruption, such as with fertilizer and petrol subsidies and wage bill computerization; reforms in the communication technology sector; freedom of information and democratic institution-building; free and fair elections, etc. Interestingly, even in his areas of vulnerability, Jonathan has some defences – while he has been slow in reaching a decisive posture against “Boko Haram”, the current onslaught is very effective while APC and particularly its presidential candidate’s statements on the issue have been shameful (e.g., “military offensive against ‘Boko Haram’ anti-North” – THISDAY June 3, 2013); while there seem to be grounds for worrying about elevated corruption, allegations that $20 billion or N30 trillion is missing are baseless propaganda!); the populace resisted downstream deregulation and the legislature prevented PIB passage); and governors and legislators prevented NSIA from operating, insisted on high oil price benchmarks and insisted on depletion of excess crude savings!
The “continuity” policy outlook is essentially more of the same – sustained market-based economic reforms; entrenchment of power sector development under substantial private ownership, contractionary monetary policy, implementation of the Oronsaye Committee Report (attempting to reduce the size of the public sector), automobile reforms implementation, greater focus on taxes, PPPs and some level of increased public sector debt. Opponents may, of course, add continued corruption! The “change” outlook naturally involves higher transaction risks and uncertainty over possible policy direction, especially in light of Buhari’s history of statist and control-led economic thinking and Tinubu’s public advocacy for large scale extra-budgetary spending. There also appears to be a regional bias against markets and reforms up North which may influence policy under a Buhari-led APC government. We expect some intra-government “debates” between the party’s Northern and Western factions, especially over economic policy, federalism, constitutional reform and power-sharing! The APC electoral platform is explicitly expansionary in terms of fiscal and monetary policy and it is unclear how the party hopes to fund many of the social welfare promises in its manifesto beyond printing currency! An attempt to implement many of those commitments may produce double-digit inflation and huge budget deficits. I concede, however, that social intervention must increase under either scenario, but the issue is size and strategy. The popular expectation is that Buhari regime may “fight” corruption, though no one knows exactly how or whose corruption will be fought!
I have written previously about the surprising lack of analysis of the policy content of the choices Nigeria faces in the presidential contest later this month. While slogans and conventional wisdom may be sufficient for others, managers, businesses, business groups, investors and other enlightened stakeholder groups are expected to engage the candidates and political parties on the basis of policy and platform. That is the only way we can build a developmental state rather than a state-dominated democracy.
Opeyemi Agbaje
