Our national security has tragically deteriorated and is in need of urgent fixing, yet we only mouth the need for improvement, but the vital changes that are required remain elusive. We mouth ‘all-of-government’ and ‘all-of-society’, as well as the less often spoken ‘all-of-nation’ and ‘all-of-nations’ approaches to national security but do very little to actualise them.
“Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results.” This maxim, often cited for its clarity on flawed iterative processes, precisely mirrors Nigeria’s approach to national security. Politicians condemning impunity without holding themselves or the officials they appointed to positions of responsibility accountable, singling out leadership of the armed forces organisations out of the twenty-nine (29) primary and an additional fourteen (14) associated ministries, departments and agencies in the security sector to change them and their subsequent swift confirmation by the Senate is a profound exercise in structural and institutional self-delusion. So also is the refusal to convene the National Security Council, as is the numbness with which the country continues to respond to colossal security failures, including the invading and killing of residents of rural communities across several states, the abduction of six directors of the Ministry of Defence, who were commuting along the Lagos – Kogi – Abuja route, the disappearance of a military commander in the North East, who may have been executed by an ideological non state armed group, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, ISWAP, and the abduction of secondary students in Kebbi State as well as the reckless exposure of several National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) on a known security challenged route whom the military reportedly rescued after their vehicles broke down.
Every time service chiefs are changed, the nation expresses cautious optimism, expecting that replacing the tactical commanders will resolve a strategic and systemic collapse and result in improved national security. This article dissects why this expectation is flawed, focusing on the inevitable failure of a select number of personnel rotations without deep structural Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the pedestrian nature of the legislative oversight designed to check this cycle.
“The service chiefs can evolve and implement operational and tactical plans, but the responsibility for strategic planning and coordination is not theirs alone.”
The core flaw in Nigeria’s counter-insurgency effort in this fourth republic is its persistent diagnosis of a systemic pathology as mere leadership failure. Nigeria’s national security crisis is rooted not in the competence (or its lack) of individual security sector ministries, departments and agencies’ leadership, but in a structurally dysfunctional national security enterprise characterised by institutional impunity and a legacy of military-era centralisation.
On October 24, 2025, President Tinubu carried out a military command structure overhaul, elevating General Olufemi Oluyede from his appointment as Chief of Army Staff to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Major General Waidi Shaibu became the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Air Vice Marshal S.K. Aneke the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), and Rear Admiral I. Abbas, the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). Major General E.A.P. Undiendeye retained his position as the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI).
Lt Gen. Olufemi Oluyede is a battle-tested infantry officer and strategic thinker. He previously served as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), and before that, Commander of the Infantry Corps. His experience includes international missions (ECOMOG) and commanding counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast. His elevation demands greater inter-service synergy. Maj. Gen. Waidi Shaibu is a highly decorated, battle-hardened field commander from the Armoured Corps, renowned for leading major offensive and clearance operations as Theatre Commander of Operation Hadin Kai in the Northeast. His reputation is built on tactical precision and front-line effectiveness. Rear Adm. Idi Abbas brings decades of naval command, operations, and maritime security experience. He previously served as Flag Officer Commanding Central Naval Command, where he led decisive operations against illegal crude oil theft and piracy in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea. Air Vice Marshal Kennedy Aneke is an accomplished aeronautical engineer and combat aviator with over 4,300 flying hours. His background underscores a focus on technological leverage, including the deployment of drone technology and precision air campaigns to support ground troops.
Despite these impressive credentials, the service chiefs inherited a system where military doctrine is inappropriately placed within the context of a complex and dynamic security environment, bedevilled by equipment deficit, low personnel morale, and a shortage of personnel both in terms of numbers and specialised skill sets, and where fiscal opacity, inter-agency rivalry, and executive over-centralisation are manifest. Not surprisingly, the period immediately following this military leadership transition was characterised by their rapid exposure to critical, interwoven security lapses: systemic failure of internal command integrity in the aftermath of a coup attempt; immediate tactical and technological vulnerabilities following complex attacks by ISWAP using unmanned aerial vehicles; sophisticated threats involving a known Sahelian terror group, JNIM, allegedly infiltrating Nigerian territory; and the operational collapse of soft-target protection indicated by attacks on religious places of worship and the abduction of secondary school students in Kebbi State.
The mandate given to these new service chiefs by President Bola Tinubu was to immediately strengthen the national security architecture and deliver “results, not excuses”. This is surprising because it is not the role of the service chiefs to strengthen national security architecture but that of the coordinating elements in the national security enterprise, including the National Security Adviser and the Ministers of Defence, Interior and Police Affairs. The service chiefs can evolve and implement operational and tactical plans, but the responsibility for strategic planning and coordination is not theirs alone. And this responsibility is best addressed at the National Security Council and the intelligence community, as outlined in the Constitution. And in extreme circumstances, it is the responsibility of the National Defence Council.
The Senate confirmation hearing is the legislature’s most definitive constitutional opportunity to exert civilian oversight and democratic control. Yet, as we saw in the proceedings that led to the confirmation of Gen. Oluyede and the other service chiefs, the process remains woefully superficial and underwhelming, severely undermining the authority of the red chamber. Some of the noted shortcomings include:
● Absence of technical depth: Hearings rarely transition from rhetorical enquiries into a rigorous technical examination. Nominees, like Lt Gen. Oluyede, who transition from one command to another, should face granular scrutiny on unaddressed audit queries, logistics failures, and documented human rights compliance issues from their past commands. Instead, questions often skirt detailed scrutiny of operational logistics and financial integrity in favour of vague pledges of loyalty and patriotism.
● Procedural secrecy and expediency: The most crucial vetting is often conducted behind closed doors in the Committee of the Whole, shielding the nominees, and the legislature, from essential public scrutiny. When confirmations are accelerated under the pretext of ‘national urgency’, as is common, the Senate forfeits its non-negotiable right to conduct a thorough, public audit of strategic leadership capacity.
The Senate, by failing to demand specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) KPIs from the service chiefs, linking funding to demonstrable operational and financial compliance, the red chamber confirms loyalty rather than competency. This rubber-stamping ritual completes the cycle of insanity: endorsing a flawed approach and then expecting the newly confirmed service chiefs to miraculously produce a different, better security result.
The security challenges affecting Nigeria have been allowed to fester. Let all who wish Nigeria well join hands to support a truly functional approach to solving the national security challenge. Cosmetic measures that lack institutional and structural depth and that fail to address the root causes of the challenges will be exercises in futility. Let us be serious about addressing the national security challenges before it is too late.
Kabir Adamu is the Managing Director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited.
